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ZONING-REZONES: NEW STANDARDS FOR GOVERNING BODIEs-Park-
ridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wn. 2d 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978).
Plaintiff-developer purchased lots in Seattle's Capitol Hill neighbor-
hood which were zoned for medium density apartments. I Following an
unsuccessful attempt to rezone for high density apartments in 1966,
plaintiff allowed the lots' existing residences to deteriorate. In 1973 the
City of Seattle Building Department ordered plaintiff to close, repair to
code, or demolish the buildings. Plaintiff applied for a permit to demol-
ish the structures; the city then requested the preparation of an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) detailing plaintiff's comprehensive devel-
opment plans. 2 Instead of pursuing the demolition application, plaintiff
applied for a building permit to construct a medium density apartment
unit. An EIS requirement was again imposed and plaintiff took steps to
comply.3
During the interval between plaintiff's application for a demolition
permit and its application for a building permit, a group of neighboring
residents filed a petition requesting a downzone of the property to a sin-
gle family residential classification identical to that of the adjacent resi-
dential property. 4 Following hearings before the city planning commis-
1. Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wn. 2d 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978).
2. The State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) requires that local government action "signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the environment" be preceded by an environmental impact statement
(EIS). WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030 (1976). Under SEPA and the administrative regulations pro-
mulgated'pursuant thereto, the city has authority to deny or reasonably to condition any proposal so
as to mitigate or prevent adverse environmental impacts. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-10-055 to-100
(1976).
In Parkridge, the EIS requirement was imposed after the city notified the Capitol Hill Land Use
Review Board of the demolition application. The review board demanded that the city require an
environmental assessment. The board is a voluntary organization composed of Capitol Hill residents
interested in monitoring neighborhood development. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 3, 4, Parkridge v.
City of Seattle, 89 Wn. 2d 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978). Plaintiff implied that the city's notification of
the citizen's group was clandestine, Brief for Respondents at 38, and the trial court considered the
building department's action an exhibition of favoritism and therefore violative of the appearance of
fairness doctrine, Brief for Respondents at 16. The supreme court did not reach the appearance of
fairness issue, but reacted as the trial court did, referring to the notification as a "private arrange-
ment" carried out by "someone in the City's building department." 89 Wn. 2d at 456-57, 573 P.2d
at 361. The apparent or perceived unfairness may have had a significant impact upon the supreme
court's willingness to affirm the trial court's decision.
3. 89 Wn. 2d at 457-58, 573 P.2d at 362. Both the building permit application and the imposition
of the EIS requirement occurred between the filing of the rezone petition and its approval. This
sequence affected the "vested rights" case discussed in note 9 infra.
4. 89 Wn. 2d at 457, 573 P.2d at 362. Plaintiff's parcel was also bounded by a small neighbor-
hood business zone and a city park. The property had an unusual zoning history which had some
impact on the presumption of validity to be accorded rezones. See note 51 infra.
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sion5 and the city council's committee on planning and urban
development, the city council passed an ordinance approving the down-
zone, 6 whereupon the plaintiff filed a petition for certiorari to review the
city's action. 7
5. The composition, powers, and duties of planning commissions are outlined in R.C.W. § 35.63
(1976) (cities), § 35A.63 (1976) (code cities), and § 36.70 (1976) (counties). Planning commissions
have only advisory powers and are appointed by the municipality's legislative body to act as "the
research and fact finding agency of the municipality." WASH. REV CODE § 35.63.060 (1976).
Informal public hearings were held twice before the planning commission and twice before the city
council's planning and urban development committee. The planning commission recommended to
the committee on urban development a zoning classification of RM 1600, a low density multiple
family designation. The commission pointed to factors such as proximity to a city park and access to
public transit which made the area suitable for multi-family development. Brief for Respondents at 5,
6. This suggestion was a compromise between the neighbors' request for RS 5000, a high density
single family classification and the extant RM 800, a medium density multiple family classification.
No hearings were held before the city council, although tapes of the prior hearings were available
along with other evidentiary materials such as staff reports. Although not articulated by the court, the
city council's failure to adopt the planning commission's suggestion may have supported the court's
belief that the council acted on insufficient facts. Because the city council filed no formal or informal
findings of fact or conclusions, the supreme court concluded that there was no way of knowing
whether the council considered any of the evidence before it. 89 Wn. 2d at 461, 573 P.2d at 364.
6. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance No. 103510 (June 26, 1974).
7. The writ of certiorari is well established as the appropriate means of obtaining review of munic-
ipal zoning and rezoning actions in Washington. Pierce v. King County, 62 Wn. 2d 324, 382 P.2d
628 (1963). Although use of the writ has traditionally been restricted to reviewing judicial proceed-
ings, Tenny v. Seattle Electric Co., 48 Wash. 150, 92 P. 895 (1907), Washington has recognized its
use to review the acts of a governmental body where it appears that the body acted arbitrarily, unrea-
sonably, and capriciously, and where no adequate remedy exists at law. Pierce v. King County, 62
Wn. 2d at 329, 382 P.2d at 632. Citing cases from other jurisdictions, the Pierce court held that
"[c]ertiorari is the appropriate remedy to test the reasonableness of [an] ordinance." Id. at 331, 382
P.2d at 633.
Several states have used the writ to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts only; the determination of
whether an act is judicial or legislative is "wavering." K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 24.02
(3d ed. 1972). Washington apparently does not feel bound to restrict the use of the writ to the review
of nonlegislative acts. Thus the use of the writ is not of itself sufficient to prove that the court
considers rezones quasi-judicial acts. Indeed, there has been some criticism of the restriction of cer-
tiorari to the review of only judicial acts. B. SCHWARTZ. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 185, at 530(1976).
Although the Washington courts have invoked certiorari to review rezoning actions, they have re-
viewed those actions under an arbitrary and capricious standard rather than a substantial evidence
standard. See notes 72-73 infra. The Washington statute does not specify the applicable standard of
review. It provides only that the writ shall be granted "when an inferior tribunal, board or officer,
exercising judicial functions, has exceeded [its] jurisdiction. ... WASH REV CODE § 7.16.040
(1976). The rezone in Parkridge was reviewed under R.C.W. § 7.16.120(4)-(5) (1976), 89 Wn. 2d
at 459, 573 P.2d at 363. That statute provides:
The questions involving the merits to be determined by the court upon the hearing are: ...
(4) Whether there was any competent proof of all the facts necessary to be proved, in order to
authorize the making of the determination.
(5) If there was such proof, whether there was, upon all the evidence, such a preponderance of
proof, against the existence thereof, rendered in an action in a court, triable by a jury, as would
be set aside by the court, as against the weight of the evidence.
This section seems to embody a substantial evidence standard. See notes 72-76 and accompanying
text infra (discussion of the standard used in Parkridge).
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On review, the trial court found that justifications for the rezone were
not supported by credible evidence, and overturned the rezone as arbi-
trary and capricious. 8 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed. 9 Park-
ridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wn. 2d 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978).
I. THE COURT'S HOLDINGS
In affirming the trial court's decision, the supreme court articulated
several new principles affecting the degree of deference given to rezon-
ing actions of local legislative bodies. These principles broaden the scope
of review of rezoning decisions and impose stricter standards of proof on
applicants seeking rezones. The overall effect of Parkridge is the expan-
sion of procedural due, process requirements in rezoning actions.
This note examines four aspects of rezoning decisions addressed by
the court: the policy basis upon which rezoning actions may legitimately
be grounded; 10 the quantum of evidence necessary to support a rezoning
decision;" the allocation of the burden of proof in rezoning actions;12
and the presumption of validity, if any, accorded local rezoning deci-
sions. 13
8. Parkridge v. City of Seattle, No. 783462 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County, June 10, 1975). The
trial court found the rezone invalid on four grounds: (1) the decision was unsupported by credible
evidence and therefore arbitrary and capricious; (2) the rezone resulted in an inverse spot zone; (3)
city council members who voted on the rezone failed to appear at the hearings or listen to tape record-
ings, denying the plaintiffs due process of law and violating the appearance of fairness doctrine; and
(4) the city failed to comply with SEPA. 89 Wn. 2d at 459, 573 P.2d at 363. The supreme court
affirmed on the first ground and did not reach the other issues. Id.
9. The Parkridge controversy began as two cases which were consolidated on appeal: a "rezone"
case, the subject of this note, and a "vested rights" case. In the latter case, the developers contended
they had a vested right to a building permit because application for the permit was made prior to
approval of the rezone petition. The Parkridge court stated the rule in Washington regarding the
vesting of rights to building permits: "[T]he right vests when the party ... applies for [the] building
permit, if that permit is thereafter issued. This rule, of course, assumes that the permit applied forand
granted be consistent with the zoning ordinances and building codes in force at the time of applica-
tion." 89 Wn. 2d at 465, 573 P.2d at 366 (quoting Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn. 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856,
859 (1958)).
The city contended that plaintiff had no vested right because plaintiff s design plans were not com-
plete at the time of application: they consisted only of conceptual drawings and an EIS had not been
prepared. The city building code requires that where no action is taken on an application for six
months, the plans be destroyed and the applicants reapply. SA=rr, WASH., BuILDING CODE §
3.02.030(b) (1976). The supreme court affirmed the trial court's findings that the developer had pur-
sued the application with sufficient diligence to avoid the cancellation provision in the code. 89 Wn.
2d at 465, 573 P.2d at 365. The city argued on appeal that plans must be complete when filed. Brief
for Appellants at 33. The supreme court's holding implies that total compliance is not necessary upon
initial filing: permit applicants must be given a reasonable time to complete or perfect the plans.
10. See Part II-A infra.
11. See Part l-B infra.
12. See Part l-C infra.
13. See Part II-D infra.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Public Policy: Rezone Must Bear a Substantial Relation to the Public
Welfare.
That zoning is a valid exercise of local police power has not seriously
been debated since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty. 14 But because zoning restricts an individual's
right to the unfettered use of private property, 15 zoning decisions require
a balancing of public interest and individual property rights. 16 To be
upheld, zoning regulations must bear a substantial relation to public
health, safety, welfare, or morals. 17
Zoning plans must also be flexible enough to adjust to changes in the
environment they are designed to regulate; they must respond to fluctuat-
ing concepts of public welfare. 18 The mechanism for responding to such
changes is the rezone. The Parkridge court held that to be legitimately
grounded in the police power, rezones as well as initial zoning actions
must bear a substantial relation to public welfare. 19
While the court did not articulate the means for determining whether a
rezone bears a substantial relation to public welfare, that determination
appears to require a two-fold analysis. First, the public welfare must be
defined; second, the composition of the public in the particular case must
be defined.
Zoning is a tool for implementing a comprehensive plan for develop-
14. 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
15. "It is well established that every person has the right to use his property in his own way and
for his own purposes, subject only to the restraints necessary to secure the common welfare." Hauser
v. Arness, 44 Wn. 2d 358, 367, 267 P.2d 691, 697 (1954) (quoting Midland Electric Coal Corp. v.
Knox Co., 1 I11. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275, 280 (1953)). "[Zoning regulations] constitute a serious
impairment of the right to use and enjoy property, and they ... interfere with the possession
thereof." Pierce v. King County, 62 Wn. 2d 324, 336, 382 P.2d 628, 636 (1963). See also Sager,
Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1418-19 (1978).
16. Property rights have always been subjected to some forms of control in the public interest.
Wright, Constitutional Rights and Land Use Planning: The New and the Old Reality, 1977 DuKE L.J.
841, 841-43. Professor Wright notes that zoning decisions involve more than simply balancing an
individual's right to unrestricted use of his property against the public's desire for systematic devel-
opment. It must also be recognized that zoning laws have a particularly pervasive impact, frequently
affecting individual rights not automatically connected with land use-rights such as free association
and travel. Id. at 844.
17. Hauser v. Arness, 44 Wn. 2d 358, 367-68, 267 P.2d 691, 696-97 (1954).
18. "[Zioning authorities cannot blind themselves to changing conditions." Bishop v. Town of
Houghton, 69 Wn. 2d 786, 792, 420 P.2d 368, 372 (1966). Indeed, where significant changes in
circumstances have occurred, the municipality has a duty to modify an outdated ordinance. Id.
19. 89 Wn. 2d at 461, 573 P.2d at 363.
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ment.20 In developing a plan that promotes the public welfare, zoning au-
thorities must take into account specific considerations, such as the loca-
tion of public facilities, traffic patterns, and existing and desired housing
densities. 21 All such factors affect the public welfare and must be
adequately accommodated when devising an acceptable zoning plan.
Parkridge did not formulate a definition of the public welfare peculiar to
rezones. 22 Thus, it appears that the standards for determining what is in
the public interest in initial zoning decisions23 will apply with equal force
in rezoning actions.
The more troublesome issue, particularly apparent in rezoning actions,
is defining the public whose interests are affected. In rezones which are
quasi-judicial24 there are potentially three interested groups: the oppo-
nents of the rezone, the proponents, and the general public. The Park-
ridge court declared that the public's interest must be considered. 25
While the interests of those individuals immediately affected "may be
given substantial weight,''26 the court was concerned that all aspects of
the rezone's impact be assessed by the decisionmaking body. To justify
rezones, then, the local governing body must demonstrate not only that
the interests of those immediately affected have been considered, but that
the decision accords with the general public welfare.
20. [R]ealistic municipal "planning" ... must be comprehensive, flexible, and prospective,
for it attempts to anticipate the future destiny as well as project protection for the existing social,
civic, physical, and economic values of the particular municipal area involved.
. . ."[Z]oning" on the other hand, is, in effect, a part of and an end result or product of
effective municipal "planning"....
Shelton v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wn. 2d 28, 35, 435 P.2d 949, 953 (1968).
The terms planning and zoning are frequently confused. Until recently, there has been little judicial
consideration of the effect of a comprehensive plan on zoning ordinances. See Haar, "In Accordance
With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HLv. L. Rev. 1154 (1955). Parkridge requires cities to produce
"substantial evidence" in support of rezones to assure that the change will be in the public interest.
89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364. The case thus lends strength to existing comprehensive plans
which presumably reflect general public welfare considerations. See notes 49-52 and accompanying
text infra.
21. R.C.W. § 35.63.090 (1976) requires that zoning regulations be part of a comprehensive plan
designed to, inter alia, encourage the most appropriate use of land, reduce traffic congestion, prevent
overcrowding, promote coordinated development, encourage development of community units, and
facilitate adequate provision of transportation, water, and sewerage. Similar provisions are found in
R.C.W. § 35A.63.061 (1976) and R.C.W. § 36.70.760 (1976).
22. The court said only that "the rezone must bear a substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, morals or welfare." 89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. See note 68 infra for a discussion of the characterization of rezones as legislative or quasi-
judicial.
25. 89 Wn. 2d at 462-63, 573 P.2d at 364.
26. Id. at 462, 573 P.2d at 364.
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B. Quantum of Evidence: A Rezone Must be Supported by Sufficient
Evidence.
As noted, a rezone must bear a substantial relation to the public wel-
fare.27 This requirement raises the question of the nature and extent of
evidence necessary to show a public benefit. The trial court in Parkridge
overturned the city's approval of the rezone petition because it found no
credible evidence to support the action. 28 In affirming, the supreme court
held that the rezone must be supported by "substantial evidence,''29 cit-
ing an Oregon case, Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners.30 In
Fasano it was held that such evidence, "at a minimum, should show (1)
there is a public need for a change of the kind in question, and (2) that
need will be best served by changing the classification of the particular
piece of property." 31
The Parkridge court found that the city had failed to meet the suffi-
cient evidence standard of Fasano.32 The primary support for the city's
action was evidence of a change in community attitudes toward preserv-
ing single family neighborhoods. 33 The court, while noting that the views
of the immediately affected residents were not to be denigrated, found
the evidence insufficient to demonstrate a need for change in the public
interest. 34
An examination of prior land use cases suggests those factors which
the Washington court will consider sufficiently demonstrative of the need
for a zoning change: traffic congestion, 35 inadequate public facilities, 36
27. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
28. 89 Wn. 2d at 459, 573 P.2d at 363. The credible evidence standard is essentially a restatement
of the substantial evidence standard. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text infra. One court de-
fined the standard as follows: "We must 'determine whether the findings made "are supported by
and in accordance with reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole administrative record,
• ..and whether the conclusions of the Board [of Zoning Adjustment] flow rationally from these
findings .... " ' " Association for Preservation of 1700 Block of N. St., N.W., and Vicinity v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 384 A.2d 674, 677 (D.C. 1978) (citationsomitted).
29. 89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364.
30. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
31. Id., 507 P.2d at 28.
32. 89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364.
33. Id.
34. "A reference to changed attitude in the neighborhood ... [does not rise] to the level of sub-
stantial evidence necessary to establish that conditions had so markedly changed.., that a rezone [is]
required in the public interest." 89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364. The court went on to note that
while the views of those affected may be entitled to substantial weight, "[tlhey cannot ... be con-
trolling absent compelling reasons requiring a rezone for the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare." Id.
35. State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wn.
2d 378, 384-86, 312 P.2d 195, 198-99 (1957) (where no systematic, detailed traffic survey had been
made, city's refusal to grant petitioner authority to construct a church because neighbors contended
traffic would be a problem held arbitrary and capricious).
36. SAVE v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn. 2d 862, 868, 576 P.2d 401, 405-06 (1978) (city's grant of
260
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and significant environmental impact,37 all of which affect the general
public. The Parkridge court emphasized that individual rights should not
be restricted unless curtailment advances a public interest beyond that of
a small but vocal minority.
C. Burden of Proof. The Party Seeking a Rezone Bears the Burden of
Proof.
By characterizing comprehensive zoning acts as legislative and re-
zones as adjudicative, 38 Parkridge placed the burden of proving that a
rezone is in the public interest on the party seeking modification of the
zoning ordinance. 39 This allocation is a departure from the judiciary's
customary deference to decisions made by a legislative body.40 The City
of Seattle objected strenuously to this allocation, noting the lack of pre-
cedent for "put[ting] the city to its proof.' '41 The court's rejection of the
city's position means that, in review of rezones approved by the munici-
pality, the governing body is placed in essentially the same position as a
private party. 42
In Parkridge, the city, having approved the rezone, was considered
the proponent. It therefore carried the burden of proving that the rezone
was justified in the public's interest; its decision was not entitled to a pre-
sumption of validity. 43 The city argued that this allocation of the burden
of proof put it at an "undeserved disadvantage" and that "opponents of
controversial rezones [would] be encouraged to seek judicial review. "44
The city further contended that as a result of the court's allocation of the
burden of proof, local governing bodies would be forced to adhere ri-
rezone invalid where evidence showed, inter alia, that the requirements of "substantial investments
in highways, sewers, and other services and utilities" had been disregarded).
37. Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416, 422-23, 526 P.2d 897,
902 (1974) (where statements regarding environmental impact of project had been obtained from
health department, park district, fire department, public works department, and public schools, and
where there was a showing that population density would not be significantly increased, rezone not
arbitrary or capricious).
38. 89 Wn. 2d at 463, 573 P.2d at 365. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text infra (discussion
of the nature of rezones as legislative or quasi-judicial).
39. 89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364.
40. The deference stems from concepts of separation of powers. See note 57 infra. Prior to charac-
terizing rezones as quasi-judicial in 1971, see note 68 infra, the court had shown considerable defer-
ence to municipal legislative decisions in the zoning area. See, e.g., State ex rel. Myhre v. City of
Spokane, 70 Wn. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967); McNaughton v. Boeing, 68 Wn. 2d 659, 414 P.2d
778 (1966).
41. Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration at 6, Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wn. 2d 454,573
P.2d 359 (1978).
42. See note 48 and accompanying text infra.
43. 89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364. See also notes 56-63 and accompanying text infra.
44. Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration at 6.
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gidly to outdated zoning plans. 45 These fears, however, are not entirely
warranted. When an adjudicative rezone is challenged in court, the local
governing body must prove that the rezone bears a substantial relation to
the public health and welfare if that body is the proponent of the re-
zone. 46 As a practical matter, the Parkridge court's holding will most
substantially affect the parties before the local governing body. 47 The
original rezone applicant bears an initial burden of producing sufficient
evidence to convince the local governing body that there is a need for the
change in the public interest. The governing body in effect adopts that
evidence to support its action. In other words, applicants for a rezone are
to be put to their proof, and the governing board's decision stands or falls
accordingly. Thus, had the rezone applicants in Parkridge produced suf-
ficient credible evidence demonstrating a public need for the downzone
before the city, the city's subsequent approval of the downzone would
probably have been sustained by that same evidence. By the same token,
when the governing body introduces a rezone of an adjudicative nature
on its own initiative, it assumes the position of a private applicant from
the outset and is indeed "put . . .to its proof. "48
This allocation of the burden of proof provides some assurance that lo-
cal decisionmakers will afford adequate procedural fairness to parties af-
fected by a rezone. 49 Local decisionmakers may also be more demanding
of special interest groups urging a rezone because in most cases the
burden is upon that group to provide the required quantum of evidence.
As previously noted, Parkridge generated apprehension that local de-
45. Id. See also Alkire, Washington's Super-Zoning Commission, 14 GoNz. L. REv. 559, 590
(1979). A rezone may, in a particular case, be legislative and therefore be entitled to a presumption of
validity. See note 62 infra.
46. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
47. The court in fact stated that "the proponents of the rezone have the burden of proof." 89 Wn.
2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364. While this holding was directed to the proponents before the trial court, in
practical effect it places a greater burden on the party originally requesting a rezone. In Parkridge the
neighbors who filed the rezone petition were the original parties in interest and thus should have
demonstrated to the governing body that the rezone was necessary in the public interest.
48. Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration at 6. The city assumes the position of a private appli-
cant whenever the rezone is of a quasi-judicial nature. See note 68 infra.
49. The Parkridge decision also gives some assurance that property interests will not be substan-
tially altered by rezones unless justified by reasons at least as compelling as those justifying the origi-
nal zoning. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra. The decision encourages local governing bod-
ies to impose a heavier burden of proof on the proponents of a rezone. While an individual has no
absolute right to a particular zoning classification of his or her property, "zoning implies a degree of
permanency," Farrell v. City of Seattle, 75 Wn. 2d 540, 543, 452 P.2d 965, 967 (1969), and a
heavier burden of proof on the proponents is therefore appropriate. Since zoning regulations provide
a "degree of stability and continuity in the usage of land to which affected landowners are entitled to
look in the orderly occupation, enjoyment, and development of their property," Chrobuck v.
Snohomish County, 78 Wn. 2d 858, 868, 480 P.2d 489, 495 (1971), substantial procedural fairness
is proper when that property is subjected to a rezone.
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cisionmakers will be unduly constrained by outdated zoning ordi-
nances. 50 In one sense, such apprehension is justified since the Parkridge
decision strengthens existing comprehensive zoning ordinances51 by ac-
cording them a strong presumption of validity. 52 To overcome this
presumption, the rezone applicant, and ultimately the decisionmaking
body, must prove that circumstances have so changed that a rezone is
warranted. 53
Assuming the validity of the Parkridge court's characterization of re-
zoning actions as adjudicative, it cannot be said that the court is unfairly
intruding upon the legislative sphere. 54 To the extent that the original
zoning is considered legislative and granted a presumption of validity, 55
the Parkridge decision enhances the integrity of that legislative act. If,
however, the rezone on its facts calls for a legislative response, the local
governing body's decision should be granted a presumption of validity in
accordance with traditional treatment of legislative acts.
D. Presumption of Validity: No Presumption of Validity Attaches to Re-
zoning Actions.
The Parkridge court held that no presumption of validity attaches to
50. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra. Courts frequently have been criticized for their
failure to require a showing that rezones further land use policies set forth in comprehensive plans.
See generally Haar, supra note 20. This criticism often arises in cases involving alleged spot zoning,
an issue raised before the Parkridge trial court but not reached on appeal. 89 Wn. 2d at 459, 573 P.2d
at 360. Washington courts, however, have recognized the importance of observing comprehensive
land use policies in rezone actions. See, e.g., Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wn. 2d 858,
867-68, 480 P.2d 489, 495 (1971).
51. Parkridge appeared to redefine the type of original zoning ordinance which is entitled to a
presumption of validity. The definition apparently has been extended to include rezones which have
been challenged and upheld, or which have stood unchallenged for a reasonable period of time. The
property in Parkridge was zoned RS 5000, a high density single family residential zone, under a
comprehensive zoning ordinance enacted in 1957; it was upzoned in 1959 to RM 800. 89 Wn. 2d at
456, 573 P.2d at 361. The court noted that: "IThe original rezone of these lots in 1959 must be
presumed to have followed from regular and proper procedures and we are directed to no evidence in
the record which would suggest that the rezone was invalid at the time it was made." 89 Wn. 2d at
462, 573 P.2d at 364.
52. 89 Wn. 2d at 460, 573 P.2d at 363. See note 60 and accompanying text infra (discussion of the
presumption of validity).
It is well established that an original zoning ordinance carries a stronger presumption of validity
than its subsequent amendments. I E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcnca § 7-7, at 325 (3d ed. 1965).
As previously noted, amendments which have withstood challenge or have endured a reasonable
length of time enjoy the same presumption of validity as the original. I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING § 4.26, at 238 (2d ed. 1968); see note 51 supra. The reasoning behind this presump-
tion,which is usually apparent in cases including alleged spot zoning, is that frequent rezoning tends
to corrode a comprehensive plan. See generally I R. ANDERSON, supra, §§ 5.08-5.18.
53. 89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra (discussion of
the public interest requirement for approval of rezones).
54. Alkire, supra note 45, at 591-96.
55. See notes 51-52 supra.
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rezoning actions. 56 This holding initially appears to alter the traditional
concept of separation of powers by substituting judicial for legislative de-
cisionmaking. 57 On closer scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent that
the court's objective was to insure adequate procedural fairness rather
than to guarantee the correct result in all cases. 58 To accomplish that ob-
jective, the court concerned itself with the nature of the rezone action
rather than with the status of the decisionmakers as a legislative or ad-
ministrative board. 59
Full understanding of this aspect of Parkridge requires brief inquiry
into the theoretical bases for characterizing particular actions as legisla-
tive or quasi-judicial and an examination of the consequences of such
characterization. Legislative acts are cloaked with a presumption of valid-
ity. One reason for this presumption is the assumed ability of the electoral
process to remedy abuses of legislative power. 60 It does not follow, how-
ever, that every decision made by an elected body is a legislative act.
56. 89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364.
57. The separation of powers doctrine is a fundamental aspect of the American system of govern-
ment. The essential idea is that "persons intrusted with power in any one of [the three] branches [of
government] shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others." Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881). The concept is embodied in both the federal and state consti-
tutions. Legislative powers are vested in Congress or the state legislature, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § I.
WAsH. CONST. art. II, § 1; judicial powers are vested in the courts, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I, WASH.
CONsT. art. IV, § 1. It has been argued that the separation of powers doctrine is too rigid an analytical
tool for intelligent evaluation of land use problems. Halting further inquiry because an action is
labeled legislative "avoids consideration of 'essential fairness' . ., and forecloses examination
of the rational connection between the action taken and the situation dealt with." Wengert, Constitu-
tional Principles Applied to Land Use Planning: A Tentative Restatement, 19 NAT. REsoURcIs J. I. 8
(1979). Professor Davis notes that the "danger of . . . injustice lurks in unchecked power. not in
blended power." K. DAvis, supra note 7, § 1.08, at 25. But see Alkire, supra note 45, at 591-96
(criticism of the Washington Supreme Court's activism in zoning cases generally).
58. It appears that the court tried to delineate procedural safeguards for rezone actions by requiring
the governing body to articulate reasons for its decisions. See Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of
Rezoning Procedure: The Complementary Requirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA.
L. REv. 753, 766-67 (1976) (general discussion of why imposition of procedural safeguards is an
appropriate judicial role in review of rezone actions); Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1427, 1502-23 (1978)[hereinafter cited as Zoning Developments].
59. The court cited Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) in character-
izing the rezone actions as "basically adjudicatory." 89 Wn. 2d at 463, 573 P.2d at 365. The Flem-
ing court discussed in detail the factors leading to a conclusion that rezones may be quasi-judicial
rather than legislative acts: the presence of distinct parties in interest, the localized applicability of
rezones, and the statutory requirement of zoning hearings. 81 Wn. 2d at 298-99, 502 P.2d at 331.
60. There are three principal reasons for according a presumption of validity to legislative acts:
administrative problems would ensue if each person affected by a decision were accorded individual
due process; the size of the group affected by most legislative acts guards against unreasonable ac-
tions; and recourse is available through the legislative process. Zoning Developments, supra note 58,
at 1508-09.
Courts have used three tests to determine whether an action is legislative or adjudicative, none ot
which is entirely satisfactory. Some courts have focused on the nature of the decisionmaking body as
appointed or elected. Others have resorted to blanket classification of all acts relating to a particular
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Rather, legislative bodies, particularly local ones, 61 may perform admin-
istrative or adjudicative tasks under particular circumstances. 62 For exam-
ple, a local governing body may act legislatively when planning the ex-
pansion of a municipal water system and administratively in determining
whether a particular subdivision within that planning area will receive a
water permit or license under particular circumstances. When an elected
body acts in a nonlegislative capacity, as when it grants permits, due
process usually demands greater attention to procedural fairness because
aggrieved individuals have no redress through the electoral process. 63
subject matter as one or the other. Still others have gone to great lengths to distinguish policy
decisions from decisions based on the specific facts of the case; the former decisions are deemed
legislative, the latter quasi-judicial. Id. at 1509.
61. There are significant differences between local legislative bodies and state and federal legisla-
tures: local bodies typically possess only powers delegated by the state with implicit or explicit sub-
stantive and procedural limitations and frequently exercise both legislative and administrative pow-
ers. They are, furthermore, "heirs to the judicial suspicion of local government . . . generated by
political struggle and incidents of municipal corruption." 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
2D § 25.05, at 209 (1976). Accordingly, courts have not hesitated to scrutinize carefully the decisions
of local legislative bodies. Id.
In Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973) (en banc), cited in
Parkridge, 89 Wn. 2d at 461, 573 P.2d at 363, the court stated:
[W]e would be ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as
legislative acts to be accorded a full presumption of validity and shielded from less than
constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers. Local and small decision groups
are simply not the equivalent in all respects of state and national legislatures.
See note 68 infra (discussion suggesting the appropriateness of increased judicial scrutiny when re-
zones are at issue).
62. Analogies can be drawn from administrative law. An act is legislative in nature when it has
general applicability and addresses future conduct. An adjudicative act, however, is one which has an
immediate effect on identifiable parties and in which the decision turns upon the particular facts. B.
ScHwARTZ, supra note 7, § 55, at 144. See also Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226
(1908); American Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 359 F.2d 624, 636-37 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
This classification poses a conceptual problem when discussing rezones. In one sense, the court in
Parkridge seems to recognize that rezones are legislative, emphasizing that rezones must be carried
out in the public interest because they affect the general public welfare. On the other hand, the pub-
lic's interest must be considered because all zoning actions, as an exercise of the police powers, must
be grounded in the public interest. See notes 14-17 supra. This consideration alone does not convert
an action which is essentially adjudicative into one which is legislative. "Although important
questions of public policy may permeate a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater impact
on one group of citizens than on the public generally." Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d 292,
299, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972) (en banc).
No classification approach is entirely satisfactory because rezones may arise in any number of
factual situations. A twofold approach has been suggested for differentiating legislative from adjudi-
cative actions. It calls for consideration of the nature of the underlying facts, and consideration of the
particularity of impact of such decision. Zoning Developments, supra note 58, at 1510. The author
argues that this approach "comports with the functional analysis of procedural due process." Id. at
1512.
63. Procedural due process considerations are triggered when the action is not legislative and there
is a protected interest in life, liberty, or property at stake. Zoning Developments, supra note 58, at
1503. Procedural due process promotes three interests: (1) governmental decisions that are correct
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Although there is no "bright line" dividing legislative from adjudica-
tive actions,64 the distinction is necessary because there are different con-
sequences depending on the classification-for example, there are differ-
ences in the record and hearing requirements 65 and in the standard of
judicial review.66
Classification is particularly difficult in rezoning actions where the
factual situations may vary so as to call for a legislative or an adjudicative
response in a given instance. 67 Since 1971 the Washington Supreme
Court has nonetheless consistently characterized rezones as quasi-judi-
cial, 68 and the facts of Parkridge fell squarely within that category. 69
The Parkridge court characterized the entire rezoning action as quasi-
judicial. 70 The court thus rejected the city's argument that only the deci-
sionmaking process was quasi-judicial, while the ultimate rezoning deci-
sion retained its legislative nature and was thus immune from serious
judicial scrutiny. 71
and promote the public welfare; (2) adequate representation for affected individuals; and (3) govern-
ment justification of its actions to persons directly affected. Id. at 1505.
64. Bell Telephone Co. v. F.C.C., 503 F.2d 1250, 1268 n.26 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1026 (1975) (quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. E.P.A., 481 F.2d 1, 5-6 (3d Cir. 1973)).
65. See notes 77-79 and accompanying text infra.
66. See notes 72-76 and accompanying text infra.
67. The facts of a particular case may call for either a legislative or an adjudicative response from
the governing body. See note 62 supra. While this inability clearly to categorize a rezone action may
not be desirable from the standpoint of prescribing a given set of procedural requirements, due pro-
cess considerations are themselves flexible. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1267, 1277 (1975).
68. Prior to 1971, the court consistently characterized rezones as legislative acts. See, e.g.. Lil-
lions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn. 2d 629, 632, 289 P.2d 203, 205 (1955). Beginning with Chrobuck v.
Snohomish County, 78 Wn. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971) (en banc), the court just as consistently
labeled rezones as adjudicative acts. The reasoning behind this shift was first articulated in Fleming
v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). The court observed that "[djecisions which
amend or change conditions under existing zoning laws ... require an extremely sensitive balance
between individual rights and the public welfare." Id. at 295, 502 P.2d at 329. The court further
noted that "zoning reclassifications are sufficiently distinguishable from other legislative functions
[of local elected bodies] that an exception to the general rule [insulating legislative bodies from judi-
cial scrutiny] is desirable." Id. at 298, 502 P.2d at 330-31. See also Comment, Zoning Amend-
ments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 132 (1972)
("[Blecause of the procedural informality and limited judicial review which accompany legislative
action, the presence of improprieties looms large, and individual rights are often sacrificed on the
alter [sic] of public opinion or ex parte over lunch at the club.'"(footnotes omitted)); Comment, De-
velopments in the Search for Workable Standards of Judicial Review of Piecemeal Rezoning, 24
CATH. U.L. REV. 294, 294-95 (1975).
69. In Parkridge there were two distinct parties in interest, the rezone had a direct impact on the
property rights of the parties in question, and the decision turned on the facts of the case. See note 59
supra.
70. 89 Wn. 2d at 460, 573 P.2d at 363.
71. The City of Seattle contended that the court's prior decision in Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81
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1. Expanded scope of review
In characterizing rezones as quasi-judicial actions, Parkridge altered
the applicable standards of judicial review. Traditionally, legislative
factual determinations have been reviewed under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard, 72 while judicial factual determinations are upheld if sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 73 The Parkridge court apparently moved
from the arbitrary and capricious to the substantial evidence standard,
raising concern that it would no longer give deference to local decision-
makers. 74 This fear is unwarranted. Although theoretical differences exist
between the two standards, 75 in practical application the differences are
not significant. 76 It is therefore doubtful that the label applied will affect
the scope of review.
2. The record requirement and procedural due process
Parkridge requires governing bodies to file findings of fact and reasons
Wn. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en banc), had simply labeled the decisionmaking process adjudi-
cative while the end result retained its legislative nature. Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration at
3.
72. Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, legislative actions are invalid if unsupported by
evidence in the record, and made in disregard of the facts. State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70
Wn. 2d 203, 207, 422 P.2d 790, 792 (1967). The arbitrary and capricious standard is used to review
discretionary action where no formal record is produced. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 215, at 605, §
217, at 609.
73. The substantial evidence standard refers to whether or not the findings of fact are based upon
substantial evidence, looking at the whole of the evidence and determining whether the conclusion
was reasonable in light of the same. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 210, at 595. The substantial evi-
dence standard is a "middle position" under which "the court decides questions of law but.., limits
itself to the test of reasonableness in reviewing findings of fact." K. DAvis, supra note 7, § 29.01, at
525.
The substantial evidence standard has frequently been applied in other jurisdictions in reviewing
factual determinations of municipal bodies in rezoning actions, although no Washington case has
expressly acknowledged its reliance on the standard. See, e.g., Muller v.. City of Albuquerque, 92
N.M. 264, 587 P.2d 42 (1978); Association for Preservation of 1700 N St., N.W., and Vicinity v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 384 A.2d 668 (D.C. 1978). The Parkridge court
was unclear about the standard it was using. Although the action was labeled adjudicative, and the
court found the evidence insufficient, 89 Wn. 2d at 462, 573 P.2d at 364, it labeled the city's action
arbitrary and capricious, 89 Wn. 2d at 459, 573 P.2d at 363.
74. See note 45 supra.
75. The arbitrary and capricious inquiry theoretically limits the court's review of questions of
fact to the test of reasonableness in the exercise of discretion. K. DAvis, supra note 7, § 29.01, at
525. In Washington, however, the arbitrary and capricious standard has allowed some inquiry into
the factual determinations of a legislative body. See, e.g., Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wn.
2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971). See also B. ScHwARTz, supra note 7, § 217, at 609-10.
76. "Review of discretion is ... subject to essentially the same standard of review as findings of
fact under the substantial evidence rule." B. ScnwA1RZ, supra note 7, § 217, at 609. See also Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 417 U.S. 283,307 (1974); Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d
222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974).
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in support of rezones. 77 This requirement expands prior law which re-
quired governing bodies to provide only a verbatim record. 78 By impos-
ing this requirement, the court insured that the evidence will be given
fuller consideration. This assurance is particularly important when the de-
cisionmaking body was not the party hearing the original testimony. 79
The requirement accords with the most fundamental of due process con-
siderations: an individual whose rights are at stake is entitled to at least
the benefits of reasoned decisionmaking. 80
III. CONCLUSION
The Parkridge decision takes significant steps to protect both the inter-
ests of individuals whose property is affected by rezones and the interests
of the public in general. By reallocating the burden of proof to the propo-
nent of a rezone and requiring a more extensive record, the court
protected property owners from arbitrary decisionmaking. By expanding
and delineating evidentiary requirements to include substantial public in-
terest factors, the court assured increased consideration of the public's in-
terest.
A word of caution is nonetheless in order. The increased protections
mandated by Parkridge are appropriate when the rezone under review is
77. 89 Wn. 2d at 464, 573 P.2d at 365.
78. Barrie v. Kitsap County, 84 Wn. 2d 579, 587, 527 P.2d 1377, 1381 (1974) (en banc). Park-
ridge left open the question of what will constitute a verbatim record. Taped transcripts were pre-
sented to the court on review; the court commented that -[w]ithout a verbatim record, it is most
difficult to review the council's actions." 89 Wn. 2d at 460, 573 P.2d at 363. As the city noted,
verbatim means "word for word" and does not necessarily imply that a transcript must be written.
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration at 8. In a case subsequent to Barrie, the court accepted as the
record taped recordings of zoning proceedings. Byers v. Board of Clallam County Comm'rs., 84
Wn. 2d 796, 529 P.2d 823 (1974). However, tapes were available for only part of the proceedings
and the Byers court agreed with the trial court's finding that the records of the proceedings were
therefore "so brief as to be wholly uninformative." Id. at 799, 529 P.2d at 826. But see Beach v.
Board of Adjustment, 73 Wn. 2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968) (transcript of admittedly incomplete
shorthand notes, following failure of tape recorder, was not an accurate and complete record of board
of adjustment hearing as intended by the legislature).
Judge Friendly articulated what seems to be the soundest approach when he said that electronic
recordings in administrative hearings ought to be sufficient to generate a record, unless an appeal is
taken from that decision, in which case the tapes should be transcribed. Friendly, supra note 67, at
1292.
79. The extent to which members of the city council reviewed the record prior to making their
decision was unclear. Brief for Appellants at 25, Brief for Respondents at 6.
80. A written statement of reasons, almost essential if there is to be judicial review [of admin-
istrative decisions], is desirable on many.., grounds. The necessity for justification is a power-
ful preventive of wrong decisions. The requirement also tends to effectuate.., uniformity.. ..
A statement of reasons may even make a decision somewhat more acceptable to a losing
claimant. Moreover, the requirement is not burdensome.
Friendly, supra note 67, at 1292 (footnotes omitted).
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truly quasi-judicial in nature. The court, however, seems to label all re-
zones as quasi-judicial. Rezones may also be legislative acts. Thus,
considerable care must be taken properly to characterize the action if the
court is to avoid taking unwarranted excursions into the legislative
sphere.
Alice L. Hearst
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